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The eventual determination of public policy in the United States is often a
result of the continuous interactions and dialogues between American
legislative bodies and the courts.' Recently there has been increased scholarly
activity regarding policymaking by the often neglected state courts. 2 As Glick
notes, "Clearly, state supreme courts are important political institutions within
their own political systems, and combined, they contribute importantly to
public policy nationwide.... But research also needs to link state supreme
courts to the policymaking and political roles of other state political
institutions." 3
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Washington University, 1983; Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1990.
1 See, e.g., Louis FISHER, CONsTrrUTIoNAL DALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS
PoLTIcAL PRocEss (1988) [hereinafter FISHER, CoNSTrruTIoNAL DIALOGUES:
ImERPRLrATioN As PoLmcAL PROCESS]; JUDG AND LEGSLATORS: TOWARD
INSTrrTrIONAL Comr (ROBERT A. KATZmN ed., 1988); Louis Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985) [hereinafter Fisher,
Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress]; Beth M. Henschen & Edward I.
Sidlow, The Supreme Court and the Congressional Agenda-Setting Process, 5 J.L. & POL.
685 (1989); Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and
Congress: A Chiallenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653 (1992); cf. CHARLES
A. JOHNSON & BRADLEY C. CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACr
(1984) (examining the implementation ofjudicial policy).
2 See, e.g., STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Mary
C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982); HARRY P. STUMPF & JOHN H. CULVER, THE
POLITICS OF STATE COURTS vii (1992) (analysis of structure, policy, process, and impact of
state courts); G. ALAN TARR & MARY C.A. PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND
NATION (1988) (a comparative analysis of the activity of the Alabama, New Jersey, and
Ohio Supreme Courts); Lawrence Baum, State Supreme Courts: Activism and
Accountability, in THE STATE OF THE STATES 103 (Carl E. Van Horn ed., 1989); Stephen
Daniels, A Tangled Tale: Studying State Supreme Courts, 22 L. & Soc'Y REv. 833-68
(1988); Craig F. Emmert, An Integrated Case-Related Model of Judicial Decision Making:
Explaining State Supreme Court Decisions in Judicial Review Cases, 54 J. PoL. 543 (1992);
Craig F. Emmert & Carol A. Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, and Judicial
Policymnaldng, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 37 (1992); Herbert Jacob, Courts: The Least Visible Branch,
in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIvE ANALYSIS 252 (Virginia Gray et al.
eds., 5th ed. 1990).
3 Henry R. Glick, Policy Making and State Supreme Courts, in THE AmERICAN
COURTS: A CRriCAL ASSESSMENT 87 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
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In order to enhance our understanding of American courts as well as our
understanding of the role they play in larger political systems, this Article will
explore the relation between courts and legislatures in Massachusetts, Ohio,
and the federal system, focusing on differences in the legislators' perceptions of
the policymaking roles of their respective courts. Scholars traditionally have
paid very little attention to questions of how and why American courts differ in
their policymaking roles.4 For a complete understanding of the policymaking
role of various American courts, it is thus very important that the courts not be
treated as isolated decisionmakers, but as components of their larger systems of
government.5 As Tarr and Porter argue, "[Te understand how state supreme
courts participate in governance, one must also look at them as institutions of
state government, interacting with and both influencing and being influenced by
other political actors in the state." 6
I. NEO-INSTtUIONAL PERSPECTIVE
This Article will bring a neo-institutional perspective to the study of
interactions between courts and legislatures. As used by Epstein, Walker, and
Dixon,7 the neo-institutional approach combines the traditionalist scholars'
interest in understanding governmental bodies as institutions with the
behavioralists' emphasis on empirical, individual level research. In other
words, the neo-institutionalist perspective combines the microlevel study of
individual political behavior with the macrolevel sensitivity to the institutional
factors that help shape that behavior. As Fiorina has stated, "To a greater
degree than behavioral political scientists have acknowledged, institutional
arrangements shape individual incentives, which in turn affect behavior. Both
formal institutions and informal ones, such as custom or practice, are
important.- 8
4 See id., Charles R. Epp, Why Courts? Judicial Policy-Making in Comparative
Perspective (Apr. 9-11, 1992) (unpublished paper, on file with the Ohio State Law Journa)
This paper was presented at the April 1992 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association in Chicago, Illinois.
5 See Baum, supra note 2, at 103.
6 TARR & PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION, supra note 2, at
41.
7 Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court and Criminal Justwice Disputes: A Neo-
Institutional Perspective, 33 AM. 1. POL. Sa. 825 (1989).
8 Morris P. Fiorina, The Presidency and Congress: An Electoral Connection?, in THE
PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 443, 444 (Michael Nelson ed., 3d ed. 1990).
Other recent examples of the neo-institutional approach include: Michael M. Atkinson &
Robert A. Nigol, Selecting Policy Instrunents: Neo-Institutional and Rational Choice
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Various scholars have recently argued that the effects of institutional
context on political and judicial behavior need to be re-examined. 9 As Smith
concludes, "Ideally, then, a full account of an important political event would
consider both the ways the context of 'background' institutions influenced the
political actions in question, and the ways in which those actions altered
relevant contextual structures or institutions.
" 1°
Until the late 1950s and early 1960s, most judicial scholars used what is
now called the "traditionalist" approach to understanding political institutions
and phenomena. This traditionalist approach relied heavily on the techniques of
historical, and institutional analysis." These scholars were concerned with how
political institutions functioned and how they were structured, often with a
legalistic or normative bias in their approach to these questions. The
traditionalists tended to employ logical reasoning to analyze politics and to
Interpretations of Automobile Insurance in Ontario, 22 CAN. 1. POL. SCI. 107 (1989);
Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional
Model, 84 AM. PoL. Sa. REv. 525 (1990); Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan,
Institutional Aspects of Decision Processes, Introduction to CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND
POLICY 1-11 (Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987); Ti NEw
INSTrUTIONALUSM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell & Paul I. DiMaggio
eds., 1991) (a collection of related essays); Bert A. Rockman, The New Institutionalism and
the Old Inlitons, in NEW PRSPECrVES ON AMERICAN PoLmCS 143 (Lawrence C. Dodd
& Calvin Jillson eds., 1994); Donald D. Searing, Roles, Rules, and Rationality in the New
Institutionalism, 85 Am. POL. SCI. Rnv. 1239 (1991).
9 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 7; Melinda G. Hall & Paul Brace, Order in the Courts:
A Neo-Inftauonal Approach to Judicial Consensus, 42 W. PoL. Q. 391 (1989) [hereinafter
Hall & Brace, Order in the Courts]; Melinda G. Hall & Paul Brace, Toward an Integrated
Model of Judicial Voting Behavior, 20 AM. POL. Q. 147 (1992) [hereinafter Hall & Brace,
Toward an Integrated Model] (arguing that institutional rules affect judicial choice); James
G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalisun: Organizational Factors in Political
Life, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 734 (1984); cf JAmEs G. MARCH & JOHAN P. OLSEN,
REiDLsCOvERING INSTrrUrIoNS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS 171 (1989) (arguing
that "systemic attention to political institutions" is necessary to understand the political
system); John B. Gates, Theory, Methods, and the New Institutionalism in Judcial
Research, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRrrICAL ASSESSMENT 469, 481 (John B. Gates &
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of an
institutional analysis ofjudicial systems).
10Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism, and the
Future of Public Law, 82 AM. POL. SC. REv. 89, 91 (1988).
11 See ALAN C. JSAAK, SCOPE AND MLHODS OF POLICAL SCIENCE: AN
INTRODuciON TO THE MTHODOLOGY OF PoLICAL INQUIRY 33-38 (4th ed. 1985); Roger
H. Davidson, Legislative Research: Mirror ofa Discipline, in POLrnCAL SCIENCE: LOOKNG
TO THE FUrtRE, VOLuME FOUR: AMERICAN INsTrruriONS 1, 19-23 (William Crotty ed.,
1991).
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make normative statements about how politics and political institutions should
operate in this country. 12 They also relied heavily on description of political
realities and institutions as their main tool of analysis. The works of these
scholars were closely related to the scholarly approaches found in the
disciplines of history, philosophy, and literature. In other words, the
traditionalist judicial scholars often saw the study of politics as a branch of the
humanities.
Beginning in the late 1950s, however, a "behavioral revolution" occurred
among scholars of the courts. The new "behavioralist" approach determined
that political phenomena must be studied using a more scientific approach with
more scientific methods. 13 Over time the behavioralist view has become the
dominant approach in political science and other social science disciplines,
especially in the subfield of American politics. 14 Having developed ever more
objective and statistically oriented techniques, the behavioralists feel that the
job of judicial scholars is not merely to describe political realities, but to
predict political behavior. Thus, "[i]ts objectives are the development of
empirical generalizations and systematic theory, and the use of these in the
explanations of political phenomena." 15
The tools of the behavioralists are generally high level quantitative
statistical methods, because, "[q]uantification of data is a significant goal of
every science, and no science will develop beyond a fairly primitive level
unless it employs quantitative techniques of various sorts." 16 These
behavioralists urge scholars to study judicial political activity and behavior, not
just institutional structures, rules, and cultures. Thus judicial scholars should as
closely as possible emulate the disciplines of physics, chemistry, and the other
"hard" sciences, and abandon any links to the approaches of the softer
humanities. The adherents of this more scientific approach to the study of the
courts generally feel that only quantitative indicators of political behavior, such
12 See ISAAK, spra note 11, at 13.
13 For leading discussions of the need for a behavioralist revolution, see DAVID
EASTON, A FRAMEwORK FOR PoLmCAL ANALYSIS (1965); DAviD EASTON, THE PoLmcAL
SYSTEM (1953); HEINz EULAU, THE BEHAVORAL PERSuAsION iN PoLmcs (1963); ALBERT
SoMrr & JOSEPH TANNENHus, THE DEvELOPmEr OF AMECAN POLrrICAL ScIE-NcE:
FROM BURGESS TO BEHAVIORALISM (1967); Robert A. Dahi, The Behavioral Approach in
Political Science: Epitaph for a Monwnent to a Successfid Protest, 55 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
763 (1961); David Easton, The Current Meaning of Behavioralism, in CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL ANALYsIS 11 (Tames C. Charlesworth ed., 1967); Donald M. Freeman, The
Making of a Discipline, in POLmcAL SCIENCE: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, VOLUmE ONE:
THE THEORY AND PRACnCE OFPOLmCAL SCIEN E, 15, 26 (William Crotty ed., 1991).14 See Freeman, supra note 13, at 25-34; Davidson, supra note 11, at 27.
15 ISAAK, supra note 11, at 42.
16 Id.
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as judges' voting decisions, are worthy of study. Thus they often ignore less
quantifiable factors that also help shape the behavior of actors within political
institutions. One commentator notes that "[a] consequence of this is to treat
institutions as arenas for the behavioral predilictions of members." 17 Thus an
exclusively behavioral approach ignores important institutional constraints,
such as the political culture of the institution, which help shape the behavior of
the actors within the institution.
The institutional approach to be taken by this Article is similar to much of
the neo-institutional school now becoming more popular in the study of
legislative and judicial politics in the United States.18 It is also similar to much
of the interpretist approach used by many mainstream sociolegal researchers. 19
It to a limited extent, resembles the less radical elements of the
"postbehavioralist" approach advocated by some in the political science
discipline ° and it embraces the new interdisciplinary approach used by many
political scientists today.21 This institutional approach is quite willing to
"embrace the premise that the meanings of cultural and social forms are
17 Rockmnan, supra note 8, at 144.
18 For examples of the neo-institutional approach to judicial politics, see THE
CoNsTrTUToN AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELoPMENT: AN INSTrUTIroNAL PERSPECr1VE
(Peter Nardulli ed., 1991); Gates, supra note 9; Hall & Brace, Order in the Courts, supra
note 9; Hall & Brace, Toward an Integrated Model, supra note 9; Epstein, supra note 7;
Michael Strine, New Institutionalism in Sociolegal Research: Teaching the New Dog Old
Tricks (June 16-19, 1994) (paper presented at the 1994 annual meeting of the Law and
Society Association, on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). See generally Rogers M.
Smith, The New Institutionalism and Normative Theory: Reply to Professor Barber, in 3
STUDIES IN AMERICAN POLrICAL DEVELOPMENT 74 (Karen Orren & Stephen Showronek
eds., 1989); Smith, supra note 10.
19 See, e.g., CHRIuSTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND
INsTrrIroNALIZATIoN OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985); Carol I. Greenhouse, Courting
Difference: Issues of Interpretation and Comparison in the Study of Legal Ideologies, 22 L.
& SOC'Y REV. 688 (1988); Christine B. Harrington & Sally E. Merry, Ideological
Production: The Making of Conmmunity Mediation, 22 L. & SOC'Y REV. 709 (1988); Alan
Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applications of the Concept
of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 L. & Soc'Y RF:v. 11 (1985); Susan S. Silbey &
Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 L. & Soc'Y REv. 165
(1987); Susan S. Silbey, Ideals and Practices in the Study of Law, 9 LEGAL STUD. F. 7
(1985).
20 See, e.g., Christian Bay, Politics and Pseudopolitics: A Citical Evaluation of Some
Behavioral Literature, in APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PoLmCS 51 (Bernard Susser ed.,
1992); David Easton, Tenets of Post-Behavioralism, in APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF
POLITICS, supra, at 49.
21 See Martin Shapiro, Public Law and Judicial Politics, in POLMCAL SCIENCE: THE
STATE OFTHE DiSCJiNEI R1365, 371-74 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1993).
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constituted in their use." 22 This Article proposes that we must improve our
understandings of how political institutions actually operate by exploring the
political culture and environments within the institutions.23
Therefore, in order to understand the institutional context that shapes
relations between courts and legislatures in this country, we must understand
how courts are perceived by the other governmental institutions with which
they interact. As March and Olsen argue, "Much of the behavior we observe in
political instituti6ns reflects the routine way in which people do what they are
supposed to do. Simple stimuli trigger complex, standardized patterns of action
without extensive analysis, problem solving, or use of discretionary power."24
Legislators' attitudes toward the courts help explain both the legislatures'
formal and informal approaches to the policymaling role of the judiciary.
II. THREE DFFERENT GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEMS
This Article will compare legislators' perceptions of the policymaking roles
of three different courts,25 therefore some important structural facts about these
22 Greenhouse, supra note 19, at 687.
23 See Johm R. Baker, Exploring the "Missing Link": Political Culture as an
Explanation of the Occupational Status and Diverity of State Legislators in Thiny States, 43
W. PoL. Q. 597 (1990). See generally GABRIEL A. ALMOND, A DIScIPLINE DvIDED:
ScHooLs AND SECrs IN POLITICAL SciENcE 138, 154 (1990).
24 MARcH & OsmEN, supra note 9, at 21.
25 The data supporting this Article comes from semistructured interviews with over 75
members and staff in the United States House of Representatives conducted during the
summer of 1989, from more formally structured interviews with 129 of the 132 total
members of both houses of the Ohio General Assembly conducted during the spring of
1988, and from semistructured interviews with 64 members of both houses of the
Massachusetts General Court (32% of the total membership) during the spring of 1991
[hereinafter Miller, Interviews]. Notes were taken during the interviews and details were
added to the notes immediately following the interviews. Robert L. Peabody et al.,
Interviewing Political Elites, 23 POL. Sci. & POL. 451 (1990) identifying this method as the
preferred technique for interview documentation). This process was very similar to the
system that Kingdon used to interview Members of Congress in his landmark work. JOHN
W. KINGDoN, CoNGIRssMEN's VOTING DEcISIoNs (3d ed. 1989). The congressional
interviews focused on members of three committees in the United States House: the
Judiciary Committee, the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee (recently renamed the
Resources Committee), and the Energy and Commerce Committee (recently renamed the
Commerce Committee). The tabulations of responses, contained in this Article, reflect the
attitudes of around two-thirds of the members of these three committees. These three
committees were chosen, in part, because their individual interactions with the courts have
been discussed elsewhere in the literature. See, e.g., Mark C. Miller, Congress and the
Contitution.. A Tale of Two Conmidttees, 3 CONST. LJ. 317 (1993); Mark C. Miller,
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three systems should be noted at this point. The structure of the federal
government is quite familiar and will not be described in great detail here. The
structures of the Ohio and Massachusetts governments, however, may be less
familiar. The three legislatures in this study (the United States Congress, the
Ohio General Assembly, and the Massachusetts General Court) are quite
similar in many important respects. Both the Ohio and Massachusetts state
legislatures are highly professionalized institutions which are evolving toward
the congressional model; both are heavily lobbied by various interest groups in
their states. 26 Based on factors such as length of legislative sessions, frequency
of turnover, legislator salaries, and staffing, Jewell rates the Ohio and
Massachusetts legislatures as two of the most professionalized state legislatures
in the country. 27 In 1988, the Council of State Governments (CSG) included
Ohio and Massachusetts in a listing of the nine full-time professional state
legislatures in the United States, based on length of session, salary levels, and
occupational self-definition of members.28
Congressional Conunittees and the Federal Courts: A Neo-Institutional Perspective, 45 W.
POL. Q. 949 (1992) [hereinafter Miller, Congressional Cormittees and the Federal Courts];
Mark C. Miller, Courts, Agencies, and Congressional Committees: A Neo-Institutional
Perspective, 55 REV. POL. 471 (1993); Mark C. Miller, Lanyers in Congress: Wphat
D fference Does It Make?, 20 CONGRESS & THE PRESIDENCY 1 (1993).
All of the tables in this Article reporting congressional data are based on combined
responses from Members of Congress and from key legislative aides who stated that they
could speak for their bosses on these issues. As Aberbach stresses, "Staffers are undoubt-
edly better informants [than committee members] about many aspects of committee life
because their work time is devoted almost entirely to the committee's tasks, and they play a
crucial role in most of the decisions made." JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL
EYE: THE POLrrIC OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 227 (1990). Other respected scholars
have also used staff responses as surrogates for the responses of the Members of Congress
themselves. See, e.g., STEVEN S. SMrrH & CHRISTOPHER I. DEERINO, CoMsrrTEE IN
CONGRESS (2d ed. 1990); Charles S. Bullock, Motivations for U.S. CongressionalCommittee Preferences: Freshmen of the 92nd Congress, 1 EGI. STUD. Q. 201 (1976);
Richard L. Hall, Participation and Pwpose in Committee Decision Maling, 81 AM. POL.
Sa. REV. 105, 124 (1987). All of the congressional staffers were carefully chosen and were
asked background questions concerning their title and responsibilities in the office, the
length of time they had worked for their employer, and how regularly they spoke on behalf
of their bosses. The staffers were also asked to clearly distinguish their own personal
opinions from the opinions of their employers.
2 6 See CORNELIUS DALTON ET AL., LEADING THE WAY: A HISTORY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL COURT 1629-1980, at 347 (1984); RICHARD G. SHEImDAN,
GOvERNING QOO: THE STATE LEGISLATURE 137-57 (1989).
2 7 MALamL E. JEWELL, REPRESENTATION IN STATE LEGISLATURES 7 (1982).
2 8 COUNCIL OFSTATE GOvERNMENTs, 27 THEBOOK OFSTATES 78 (1988-89).
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While both the Ohio and Massachusetts legislatures resemble their federal
counterpart in many ways, the three court systems are quite different,
especially in their procedures for selecting judges. Of course, federal judges,
who are appointed by the President for life terms after being confirmed by the
United States Senate, are often selected based on their policy preferences.29
The court system in Massachusetts follows the usual three-tiered trial and
appellate court structure, although the organization of the lower courts in the
state is quite complex. In Massachusetts, the state supreme court is officially
known as the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). The state judges at all levels are
appointed by the Governor for life terms, 30 with confirmation by the
anachronistic and obscure Governor's Council. 31 Created in colonial times as
the people's envoy to the Royal Governor, today the Council has few formal
duties beyond confirming the Governor's judicial and quasi-judicial appointees
(such as coroners, notaries public, justices of the peace, and the solicitor-
general) and approving gubernatorial pardons. The Council consists of eight
members elected from special districts for two-year terms and the Lieutenant
Governor.32 Because the Governor's Council confirms judicial appointments,
lawyers are the most likely occupational group to run for Council seats. Only
two states (Massachusetts and New Hampshire) still maintain a governor's
council33 and many individuals in Massachusetts are calling for its abolition.34
29 See generally HENRY I. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1985) (outlining merit-based
criteria for selecting justices); LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PaOCESS AND POLICY
114-29 (2d ed. 1990); Sheldon Goldman, Federal Judicial Recdtonent, in THE AMERICAN
COURTS: A CRITICAL AsSEsSMENT, supra note 9, at 189 [hereinafter Goldman, Federal
Judicial Recruitnent]; Sheldon Goldman, Reaganizing the Judiciary: The First Terr
Appointments, 68 JUDICATURE 313-16 (1985); Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Second Terr
Appointments, 70 JUDICATURE 324, 326 [hereinafter Goldman, Reagan's Second Term
Appoinments]. See generally Elliot E. Slotnick, Lowering the Bench or Raising It Higher?:
Affinnative Action and Judicial Selection During the Carter Administration, 1 YALE L. &
POL'YREV. 270 (1983).
30 See Samuel B. Hand et al., The New England Judiciary: Courts in Transition, in
NEW ENGLAND POLITICS 158 (Josephine F. Milbum & Victoria Schuck eds., 1981).
Although not constitutionally required, since 1991 the Governor by executive order has
used so-called merit selection nominating commissions to help select candidates for the state
bench. See LYLE WARRICK, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM
OPPROViSiONS (2d ed. 1993).
3 1 See Robert L. Turner, A Council Whose Tne Has Passed, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
27, 1992, at 19.
32 See DONALD LEVrrAN & ELWYN E. MARINER, YOUR MASSACHUSETTS
GOVERNMENT 32-33 (9th ed. 1980).
33 Id.
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The legislature plays no formal role in the judicial selection process in
Massachusetts and has little informal influence in the selection decisions. 35 The
entire selection process receives very little attention in the state legislature or in
the media, although very rare newspaper articles do occasionally discuss the
judicial selection process.36 As one Massachusetts state representative
commented in an interview with this author, "It is hard to understand who
judges are and what they do in a life tenure state. We need better [public
relations] for the courts. Their decisions can't be made in a vacuum." 37
In Ohio, on the other hand, state judges are elected from top to bottom in
technically nonpartisan elections following nomination from partisan primaries.
During the general election campaign in Ohio, the two parties widely distribute
party voting cards listing the judicial candidates of their party.38 The media in
Ohio covers most judicial races, especially those for seats on the Ohio Supreme
Court, as extremely partisan events. In reality, the Ohio courts, and especially
the Ohio Supreme Court, are extremely partisan bodies whose decisions tend to
change depending on which party controls the bench.39
These three judicial selection systems can also be compared according to
the articulation level of the selection process: the number of participants in the
initiation, screening, and affirmation stages of the recruitment process.40 Using
Sheldon and Lovrich's terminology, the Ohio judicial selection system is a
highly articulated system because many actors, including interest groups, the
parties, the media, and the voters, play key roles in the various judicial
recruitment stages. 41 The federal selection system is generally a moderate
articulation system because of the relatively modest number of actors
34 See Mark C. Miller, Lawmaker Attitudes Toward Court Reform in Massachusetts,
77 JUDICATURE 34 (1993); Turner, supra note 31. See generally Renee Loth, Weld's Hunt
for Judges; He's Biding His Thrne to Find Women and Minorities, BOSTON GLOBE, July 7,
1991, at A19.
35 See Miller, supra note 34.
36 See, e.g., Loth, supra note 34.
37 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
38 See Kathleen Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections. Nonpartisan Premises with Partisan
Results, 32 Oiuo ST. LJ. 762 (1971); Lawrence Baum, Voters' Information in Judicial
Elections: The 1986 Contests for the Ohio Supreme Court, 77 Ky. L.J. 645, 652-70 (1988).
39 TARR& PORTER, supra note 2, at 124.
40 Charles H. Sheldon & Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., Assessing Judicial Elections: Effects
upon the Electorate of High and Low Articulation Systems, 38 W. POL. Q. 276, 277 (1985)
[hereinafter Sheldon & Lovrich, Assessing Judicial Elections]; Charles H. Sheldon &
Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr., State Judicial Recruitment, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A
CRITICAL AssEssMENT, supra note 9, at 161, 171 [hereinafter Sheldon & Lovrich, State
Judicial Recruiment].
41 See Sheldon & Lovrich, Assessing Judicial Elections, supra note 40.
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potentially involved in all stages of recruitment to the federal bench. Of course,
the federal selection system can become much more highly articulated at the
affirmation stage when there are highly controversial nominations to the United
States Supreme Court.42 Still, few actors participate at the initiation and
screening stages. Overall there are a moderate number of political actors
involved in the various stages of the federal selection system. The
Massachusetts selection system is a very low articulation system, because very
few actors participate in any of the recruitment stages. 43 This author's current
study suggests that the more highly articulated is the selection system, the more
active are the courts in that system.
fI. THE FEDERAL COURTS: MODERATELY AcTivE POLICYMAKERS
The fact that the United States Supreme Court and the other federal courts
are seen by legislators as key players in the federal policymaking process is
quite expected, especially for political scientists who study American courts.
For example, McCloskey has defined judicial activism as "the Supreme Court's
propensity to intervene in the governing process." 44 Direct conflicts between
the Congress and the courts over constitutional policy issues, however, remain
relatively rare,45 and are certainly less frequent than conflicts between the
President and the Congress. 46 A great deal of existing research has centered on
the extraordinary events in which the Congress as a whole has voted to
overturn or to modify a federal court decision.47 Generally, the Congress
seems to win these infrequent direct conflicts with the federal courts. As
42 See, e.g., LAWRENCEBAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 25-64 (4th ed. 1992); Goldman,
Federal Judicial Recruitment, supra note 29; David M. O'Brien, The Reagan Judges: His
Most Enduring Legacy?, in THE REAGAN LEGACY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE 60 (Charles
0. Jones ed., 1988).
43 See Miller, supra note 34, at 34-40.
44 ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 338 (1972).
45 See, e.g., Jonathan Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 50 (1976); Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 1. PuB. L. 279 (1957); Beth Henschen,
Congressional Response to the Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court, 11 AM. POL.
Q. 441, 454 (1983); Beth M. Henschen, Jud'cial Use of Legislative History and Intent in
Statutory Interpretation, 10 LEGS. STuD. Q. 353 (1985) (noting that since 1937 interactions
between the Supreme Court and the Congress have not involved constitutional policy).
46 Charles 0. Jones, Congress and the Constitutional Balance of Power, in
CONGRESSIONAL POLrrCS 322, 331 (Christopher J. Deering ed., 1989).
4 7 See WLLIAM I. KEEFE & MORRIS S. OGUL, THE AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
CONGRESS AND THE STATES 367-85 (7th ed. 1992); Miller, Congressional Conmmittees and
the Federal Courts, supra note 25.
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O'Brien explains, "On major issues of public policy, The Congress is likely to
prevail or, at least, temper the impact of the Court's rulings." 48
While congressional responses to federal court decisions do vary depending
upon which congressional committee has jurisdiction over the policy,49
generally Members of Congress see the federal courts as a natural player in the
federal policymaking process. As one Member of Congress stated in an
interview,
Our system of government is a three-legged stool. If any one of the other
two branches tips the policy balance, then Congress must return the balance by
drafting legislation. We must always be careful not to let the courts or the
agencies improperly tip the balance. It's the responsibility of Congress to
prevent the stool from crashing. 5o
An Energy and Commerce Committee staffer expressed a similar notion of how
the Congress interacts with the courts by observing, "Congress sets the general
policy, then it goes to the agencies, who have more protection to make difficult
judgment calls. Then you litigate the agency decision in the courts. The courts
are one step removed in the process, but they are a natural actor in the policy
process." 51
Table 152
How Legislators Would React to an Unfavorable Decision of Their
Respective Supreme Courts*
Legislature Total File Attack Contact Tell Do
Surveyed Bill/ Court Judges Others Nothing
Amend.
U.S. House (N=63) 100% 5% 0% 8% 70%
Ohio (N=126) 88% 4% 5% 4% 9%
Massachusetts (N=64) 53% 5% 11% 55% 70%
*Individual legislators may have given up to three responses, so percentages
will not add up to 100%.
4 8 DAVIDM. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLICS
316 (1986).49 See Miller, Congressional Conmmittees and the Federal Courts, supra note 25.50 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
51 Id.
52 Id.
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Table 1 indicates the range of reactions that legislators reported on the
question of how they would react to an unfavorable court decision in their
respective governmental system. In Table 1, because reactions to court
decisions may vary depending on the circumstances, individual legislators may
have given up to three different responses to this question. One response would
be to file legislation or a constitutional amendment in an attempt to overturn the
court's ruling. Another possible response would be to attack the courts as an
institution, such as calling for the stripping of the courts' jurisdiction over the
issue or threatening to cut the courts' budgets. A third response would be to
contact one or more of the judges personally to express displeasure over the
decision and to attempt to persuade the court to change its mind. A fourth
response would be for the legislator to talk to other officials such as party
leaders or lobbyists before deciding how to react to the court ruling. A final
response would be to do nothing.
If the courts are seen as constituting a regular part of the governmental
system's policymaking process, then one would hypothesize that the legislators
in that system would be quite willing to take legislative action to overturn or to
modify those judicial decisions that they perceive to be incorrect policy
outcomes. As Table 1 indicates, Members of the Congress did feel that it was
part of their everyday task to correct improper policy decisions by the federal
courts. Thus, all the Members of the Congress interviewed could foresee
circumstances under which they would introduce legislation or a constitutional
amendment to overturn unfavorable federal court decisions.
However, when asked whether they considered congressional reactions to
federal court decisions as a routine part of their work, or if such reactions were
considered unusual, only thirty-eight percent said that congressional reactions
to court decisions were routine.53 As one member of the House Judiciary
Committee told this author, "This committee does not often attempt to overturn
even unpopular court decisions. One needs a great deal of thought and debate
before overturning any court decision. We defer to the courts usually."5 4 This
reluctance to overturn court decisions is also revealed in Table 1, where
seventy percent of the Members of the Congress said that in some
circumstances they would do nothing in response to a decision from the federal
courts that they perceived to be unfavorable.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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Table 255
General Feelings of Members of the Congress Towards
the Federal Courts By Party
Positive Neutral Negative
U.S. House (N=63) 57% 30% 13%
Democrats (N=41) 66% 29% 5%
Republicans (N=22) 32% 36% 32%
gamma = .62 tau-b = .37
If the courts are seen as active policymakers, then one would also expect
legislators' general attitudes toward the courts to vary by party. While Table 2
indicates that the Members of Congress in this study had a generally positive
view of the federal courts overall, it also reveals that congressional feelings
toward the courts are influenced by partisan factors, with the Democrats
generally feeling more positive about the federal courts than their Republican
colleagues. This response is probably true because when these interviews were
conducted the federal courts were still perceived by many in the Congress as
the champions of liberal causes. While general attitudes toward the courts
varied by the party of the legislator, very few of the Members of Congress
discussed their reactions to unfavorable federal court decisions in partisan
terms. In other words, very few Members of Congress discussed the federal
courts as being Democratic or Republican in their orientation as policymakers,
unlike the Ohio legislators, who talked of their state courts almost exclusively
in partisan terms.
IV. THE OHIO SUPREME CoURT: PARTISAN PoimCs
Ohio legislators' perceptions of their courts are much different from the
reactions of their federal colleagues. The Ohio courts, and especially the Ohio
55 Id. Many of the tables in this Article report two statistical measures, gamma and
tau-b. Both of these statistical measures of relationships give the reader a sense of the
strength of the relationships between the variables in the tables. Both gamma and tau-b vary
from -1 to + 1. The closer each statistic is to zero, the less important is the relationship. The
closer each statistic is to the extremes of-1 or + 1, the stronger is the relationship between
the variables. The values of gamma normally tend to be higher than the values of tau-b. The
reader who is unfamiliar with these statistics should feel free to ignore these numbers or to
consult a social statistics text. See, e.g., HEBERT M. BLALoCK, JR., SOCIAL STATISTICS (2d
ed. 1979). These statistics are reported primarily for those who would like to be able to
draw some very rough comparisons across tables.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Supreme Court, are seen as highly active and partisan actors in the state's
policymaking process. 56 As one Ohio legislator complained,
I am personally disappointed with the amount of party politics that go on
in the court's decisionmaking. I realize that people can't be separated from
their "political animal." But I feel that the courts should interpret the law, not
make law. Coming out of law school, I was quite naive to the amount of
partisan politics that goes on at the Ohio Supreme Court. 57
Forte offers the following definition of judicial activism: "Tlhe court is
activist when its decisions conflict with those of other political policy-
makers." 58 In Ohio, the relationship between the courts and the legislature is
often confrontational because the courts are seen by the legislators as being
extremely partisan. This confrontational relationship is due in part to the
tradition of split-party government in Ohio. Before 1978, the Ohio appellate
courts had long been controlled by Republicans. Between 1978 and 1986,
Democrats controlled the Ohio Supreme Court. In 1986, Republicans regained
control of Ohio's high court.59 During most of this period, the legislature was
under split-party control, with the Republicans holding the state's upper
chamber and Democrats having a solid majority in the state's lower chamber.
The parties alternated control of the governor's office during this time. The
split-party tradition in Ohio politics adds to the highly partisan nature of the
Ohio Supreme Court and adds to the costs of judicial elections in Ohio. Since
the Democrats first gained control of the Ohio Supreme Court in 1978, Ohio
judicial elections have become very expensive partisan fights. In 1980, the
candidates for chief justice of the Ohio Supreme Court spent $100,000 for the
highly partisan campaign; in 1986, the price skyrocketed to $2.7 million. 60
In the interviews for this Article, many Ohio legislators assumed that it
was quite natural for the state courts to make policy. As one senior Ohio
legislator described the situation,
56 See John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, High Court-Legislative Relations: A View
from the Ohio Statehouse, 77 JUDICATURE 42, 47-48 (1993).
57 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
58 THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN PoLrrIcs: JUDICIAL AcrivisM vs. JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT 17 (David F. Forte ed., 1972); see also Bradley C. Canon, A Frameworkfor the
Analysis of Judi'cial Activism, in SUPREME COURT AcrivisM AND RESTRAINr xi (Stephen C.
Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982) ("a collection of original, historical, normative,
and behavioral essays on the exercise of activism and restraint by the U.S. Supreme Court."
Id. at xi).
59 TARR& PORTER, supra note 2, at 124-32.
60 Baum, supra note 2, at 126.
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Judges in Ohio are subject to the same influences as legislators. They get
wined and dined by the utilities and other interests in the same restaurants we
do. All business interests seek to control their future, to press their influence,
to maintain control over the court's decisions, basically to keep us out of their
decisions. 6 1
Commenting on the policymaking role of the Ohio Supreme Court, one
Democratic senator stated,
The Ohio Supreme Court serves as a convenient whipping boy for the
media and others who are upset with the political outcomes of their decisions. I
didn't like the way [the former Democratic chief justice] handled himself,
including his tactics and manipulation, but on policy questions he led the court
in the right direction. 62
This conflict between the Ohio legislature and the Ohio courts is not
unexpected, given the key role played by the parties in the nomination and
election of Ohio judges, even though the judges run on technically nonpartisan
ballots in the general election.63 Ohio judges are certainly partisan animals. As
Tarr and Porter note:
Where parties participate in selecting judicial candidates, those selected
tend to be not merely candidates with party ties but partisans. Systems that
provide for a limited tenure for judges and require them to run for reelection
on partisan ballots may reinforce the partisan perspective that a judge has
brought to the bench. 64
Another indicator of state courts' policymaling roles is the amount of attention
legislators pay to the decisions of their state courts. It is expected that the more
active the policy role played by the courts, the more attention legislators pay to
court decisions. As Table 3 indicates, Ohio legislators report that they
generally pay a great deal of attention to the decisions of the Ohio Supreme
Court, certainly more attention than their counterparts in Massachusetts. Only
nineteen percent reported that they pay little or no attention to the decisions of
the Ohio courts. Table 3 lends further support to the argument that Ohio
legislators perceive the Ohio courts as important and active policymakers.
61 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
62 Id.
63 See Kathleen L. Barber, Judicial Politics in Ohio, in GOVERNMENT AND PoLmcs IN
OMO (Carl Lieberman ed., 1984); Barber, supra note 38.64 TARR & PORTER, supra note 2, at 57.
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Table 365
State Legislators' Attention to the Decisions of Their
Respective Supreme Courts
Great Deal Some Not Much None
Ohio I(N=12) 35% 46% - 18% 1%
Massachusetts (N=64) 22% 42% 33% 3%
gamma = .33 tau-b = .18
In addition, Ohio legislators are not shy about taking action to overturn or
to modify Ohio Supreme Court decisions which they perceive to be incorrectly
decided on policy grounds. As Table 1 indicates, eighty-eight percent of the
Ohio legislators said that they would take legislative action to overturn a
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court that they perceived to be incorrect. But a
more important lesson from Table 1 is the fact that only nine percent of the
Ohio legislators volunteered that they could foresee circumstances in which
they would do nothing in response to an unfavorable Ohio court decision. In
the interviews, Ohio legislators repeatedly said that state court decisions
became important issues in their own re-election campaigns. Because they
perceive the Ohio courts as important players in the state policy game, Ohio
legislators are not at all hesitant to overturn state court decisions.
The following statements are fairly typical of the passion that Ohio
legislators express when discussing Ohio court decisions. One Ohio legislator,
commenting on possible reactions to an unfavorable decision by the Ohio
Supreme Court, stated, "I would issue a press release to scare the court to their
senses. I don't hesitate to overturn court decisions. The courts are just another
political group, in my opinion." 66 Another Ohio legislator stated,
If the courts issue a bad opinion, I'd go and talk to [first name of a Ohio
Supreme Court justice] first. They are really aloof and disconnected with the
legislature. They have a great deal of power, but most judges are unknown and
are not understood by the people. I'd make sure they understand how wrong
they are.67
65 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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Table 4 68
State Legislators' Evaluations of Their
Respective Supreme Courts
Excellent Good Fair Poor NR*
Ohio (N=127) 9% 58% 26% 2% 5%
Massachuseus (N=63) 16% 38% 17% 3% 26%
*NR=No rating because legislators refused to give rating.
During the interviews, the state legislators were asked to give a job
performance rating to their respective state supreme courts. Table 4 compares
the overall job ratings of their respective state supreme courts by Ohio and
Massachusetts legislators. The majority of Ohio legislators gave the Ohio
Supreme Court a "good" rating. Note that only five percent refused to rate the
court's job performance, another indicator of the amount of attention that the
Ohio Supreme Court receives in the Ohio legislature.
Table 569
Ohio Legislators' Evaluation of Ohio
Supreme Court by Party
Excellent Good Fair Poor
AllDemocrats (N=67) 3% 51% 43% 3%
All Republicans (N=51) 17% 77% 6% 0%
gamma = .81 tau-b = .45
However, the performance ratings of the Ohio Supreme Court are certainly
influenced by the legislators' party affiliations. As Table 5 indicates,
Republicans gave much higher ratings to the Ohio Supreme Court than did
their Democratic colleagues in Ohio. It is no coincidence that when these
interviews were conducted the Republicans had just regained their traditional
majority on the Ohio Supreme Court. As one Republican Ohio legislator
commented,
I think the Ohio Supreme Court is doing a pretty good job today because
my party is controlling the court. It's a change like night and day from when
68 Id.
69 Id.
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the Democrats had control. The previous court [controlled by Democrats]
made laws. Today's court [controlled by the GOP] just interprets them. 70
The real conflicts between the Ohio Supreme and the Ohio legislature do
not necessarily involve the court overturning recent legislative enactments.71
Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court has begun to tackle issues that the legislature
has ignored, such as workers' compensation decisions and other social issues
that the Ohio legislature had refused to address for many years because of the
split-party nature of the Ohio General Assembly. Because the legislature could
not come to an agreement on these sensitive partisan issues, the concerned
interests turned to the Ohio courts for relief. In the 1980s, the Democratic Ohio
Supreme Court became very activist on liberal social, consumer, and labor
issues. According to Tarr and Porter,
A long line of precedent pertaining, inter alia, to restrictions on suits
against state and local governments and limitations on medical malpractice
claims and on the rights of tenants, consumers, and workers injured during the
course of employment was reversed. Virtually overnight the court became
"pro-labor and highly urban" in orientation.7 2
These generally liberal social decisions generated a great deal of criticism from
many members of the more conservative Ohio legislature. This judicial
activism on social issues is probably the key reason the Ohio legislators
perceive the Ohio courts in highly partisan terms.
Thus, the Ohio courts became more activist and more visible in part
because they needed to prove to the voters that the change in party control of
the Ohio Supreme Court had produced important substantive changes in policy
outcomes. The highly partisan judicial selection system used in Ohio helps
produce highly partisan state judges who feel that they need to play an activist
role in the state's policymaking process in order to get themselves re-elected
and to help their fellow partisans in the other institutions of state government
get elected as well.
V. THE MASSACHUsETrs COURTS: A PASSiVE RoLE
Jacob entities his essay on comparative state politics, Courts: The Least
Visible Branch.73 Although it was not his intention, Jacob could easily have
70 Id.
71 See Glick, supra note 3, at 87, 100-01.
72 TARR& PORTER, supra note 2, at 128-29 (citation omitted).
73 Jacob, supra note 2.
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been referring to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). Unlike the
activist and partisan policymaking role played by the Ohio courts, the
Massachusetts SJC is perceived by its legislature as an extremely passive actor
in state politics. The Massachusetts courts are much less likely than their
counterparts on the federal or Ohio benches to become involved in purely
political policy battles in the state. As one Massachusetts senator explained it,
"The state courts [here] are less activist than the federal courts. The state courts
understand their role and feel more obligation to follow precedent and statutes.
The federal courts are legislating; the state courts are not." 74
In general, the Massachusetts legislators were quite surprised that
academics would even be interested in their state courts. The decisions of the
SIC receive very little attention in the media and in the legislature. As Table 3
indicated, Massachusetts legislators do not pay much attention to court
decisions in their state, certainly less attention than the Ohio legislators pay to
their courts. A Massachusetts representative who also practices law in the state
argued, "Comparatively speaking, the courts in Massachusetts are not very
political. Of course the courts here are somewhat influenced by politics, but not
nearly as much as in other states."75 Echoing these words, a Massachusetts
representative concluded, "Generally, there is a much quieter bench in
Massachusetts than in some other states." 76
The overall impression left by the Massachusetts interviews is that the
Massachusetts legislature does not spend a great deal of time reacting to state
court opinions because, traditionally, the state courts play a very passive role in
the state's policymaking process. For example, Glick's work from the late
1960s found that only one of the justices on the Massachusetts SJC perceived
policymaking as a proper role for the court.77
During the Massachusetts interviews, only thirty-seven percent of the
legislators spontaneously mentioned any policymaking role for the SJC
whatsoever, and only fifty-two percent could even mention a specific SJC
decision when asked to do so. As one Massachusetts representative noted, "For
us to react to the courts, it takes a combination of media attention and strong
public sentiment. Usually we don't react at all to court decisions because the
courts create little controversy in this state."78 Most of the legislators who
mentioned a specific SJC decision discussed the court's rulings on applying the
state sales tax to services or rulings on the beverage bottle deposit and
74 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
75 Id.
76Id.
77 HENRY R. GLICK, SuPREM CouRTs IN STATE POLITICS 34 (1971) (using the term
"lawmaker" instead of policymaker).
78 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
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recycling system in the state. These issues are not highly salient to the general
public, although some legislators did mention the court's highly controversial
ruling in the 1980s which struck down the state's death penalty.79 In the United
States House of Representatives and the Ohio General Assembly interviews,
virtually every member mentioned the policymaking role of their respective
courts and all mentioned a specific court case, usually one with broad ranging
policy ramifications.
As indicated in Table 3, well over a third of the Massachusetts legislators
reported that they paid little or no attention to decisions of the Massachusetts
SJC. Another clear indicator of the differences between court-legislative
interactions in Massachusetts and Ohio is the fact that only five percent of the
Ohio members refused to give a performance rating to the Ohio Supreme
Court, as indicated in Table 4, but fully twenty-six percent of the
Massachusetts legislators refused to rate their state supreme court. As one
Massachusetts representative said, "The federal courts have more impact in
Massachusetts than the state courts do. Federal judges have often forced the
legislature to act, but I have no opinions on state judges. I have no contact with
them, and they don't really affect my daily work." 80 Most of the Massachusetts
legislators who refused to rate the job performance of the SJC said that they did
not possess enough information about the decisions of the court to give it a
rating. Repeatedly, members in Massachusetts stated that the courts or court
decisions were not issues in their campaigns. In Ohio, the exact opposite was
true. Thus, the Massachusetts legislators do not pay much attention to the
courts in their state because they do not perceive the courts as important
policymakers.
Table 1 indicates that Massachusetts legislators were the least likely to
introduce legislation or constitutional amendments attempting to overturn an
unfavorable decision of the SJC. Only fifty-three percent would do so. Fully
seventy percent of the Massachusetts legislators said that they would do nothing
in response to an unfavorable state court decision. Additionally, fifty-five
percent seemed somewhat confused by the question, responding that they
would have to talk to someone else before taking action. One Massachusetts
senator, commenting on possible responses to an unfavorable decision from the
Massachusetts SJC, stated, "There is a great deal of inertia in response to the
SJC, except in the most central areas, that is, the most important issues
politically. There aren't many of those cases in this state." 81 A lawyer-
legislator in Massachusetts said, "How do I react to an unfavorable court
decision? With frustration. The courts are the final arbiter. They are the final
79 Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984).
80 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
81 Id.
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interpreter of the law and of the constitution. In this state, the decision of the
court is final."s2 Another Massachusetts representative stated, "We have no
power to change a court decision or [to change] how the courts operate. That is
not within our responsibilities." 8 3
Part of the reason that the Massachusetts state courts do not play an active
role in policymaking is that since the 1950s the Democratic Party has
controlled most of the apparatus of state government. 84 As Tarr and Porter
argue,
In one-party states, political elites (which would include the justices)
characteristically share an ideological consensus, often times supporting
institutions and practices that diverge from prevailing national
norms.... Rather than seeking to develop an independent policy role, the
state supreme court typically serves an important but subordinate role in
defending state values. 85
A Massachusetts representative supported this view by declaring, "The
Governors in this state have generally been in the mainstream of thinking in
Massachusetts, and they have appointed mainstream judges. Thus the
Massachusetts courts are very much in step with the legislature." 86 Along these
lines, a Massachusetts representative noted, "The courts have never been a
major factor in the politics of this state." 87 Another Massachusetts
representative agreed, saying, "In the history of Massachusetts, the legislature
has had little reaction to the courts. 88 The legislature does not view itself in a
contentious mode with the courts, maybe with the Governor, but never with the
courts." 8
9
Given the one party dominance of the Massachusetts state government, one
would expect that the legislators' job performance ratings of the state courts
would vary by their party affiliations. Table 6 indicates that, like their federal
and Ohio counterparts, party also affects how the legislators in Massachusetts
perceive the workings of their state courts. But recall that twenty-six percent of
the Massachusetts legislators refused to give any job performance rating for the
courts. Thus, while Democrats in Massachusetts gave higher ratings to the state
courts than did the Republicans, a sizable proportion of the legislators did not
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See DALTON Er AL., supra note 26, at 443.
85 TARR & PoRTER, supra note 2, at 56.
86 Miller, Interviews, supra note 25.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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think that they had enough information about the courts to rate them at all,
serving as further evidence that the Massachusetts courts are not perceived as
important policymakers.
Table 690
Massachusetts Legislators' Evaluation
of Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
by Party
Excellent Good Fair Poor
AllDemocrats (N=29) 28% 59% 14% 0%
All Republicans (N= 18 11% 39% 39% 11%
gamma = .61 tau-b = .36
The passivity of the Massachusetts SJC may not be apparent from other
measures. For example, on Caldeira's 1975 reputational scores, the
Massachusetts SJC ranked fifth among the states, while the Ohio Supreme
Court only ranked twenty-first.91  On the 1920 reputational scores,
Massachusetts ranked first while Ohio ranked twenty-third.92 The number of
other states that cite these two state courts are almost equal, with forty-seven
states citing the Massachusetts SJC and forty-six states citing the Ohio Supreme
Court.93 But the longstanding strong reputation of the Massachusetts SJC could
be deceiving. According to Glick's work, Massachusetts ranked tenth in the
absolute number of challenges to the constitutionality of state statutes in the
1981-1985 time period, but only twenty-fifth in the percent of state laws
declared unconstitutional. 94 And on Canon and Baum's overall tort doctrine
innovation scores for the post-World War II period, Massachusetts ranked
forty-eighth among the states and Ohio ranked eighteenth. 95 The Massachusetts
SJC is highly respected elsewhere in the nation, but the Massachusetts
legislature perceives the court as an extremely passive policymaker.
90 Id.
91 Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 PoL. BEHAV.
83, 89 (1983).9 2 Id. at 92.
9 3 Gregory A. Caldeira, Legal Precedent: Structures of Communication Between State
Supreme Courts, 10 Soc. NErwoRKs 29, 37 (1988).94 Glick, supra note 3, at 100-01.
9 5 Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law
Innovations: An Application of D'ffuis'on Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. Sci.
REV. 975, 977 (1981).
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One reason for the passive role played by the Massachusetts courts is the
fact that the entire judicial selection process receives very little attention in the
state legislature or in the media. Because the Massachusetts judges are
appointed for life terms without any real input from the voters or from the
legislature, these appointments are not perceived by state legislators to have
important policy consequences. In part, because the Massachusetts courts have
been traditionally passive in the policymaking process in this one-party state,
the relatively invisible and apolitical selection system seems to perpetuate this
passivity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
As perceived by their respective legislators, the Ohio Supreme Court plays
a very active and partisan role in the state's policymaking process, the federal
courts play a moderately active policymaking role, and the Massachusetts SJC
plays a very passive role in that state's policymaking process. These differences
should not be too surprising, given Tarr and Porter's conclusions that "[t]he
form, content, type, and effect of state supreme court policymaking is as richly
varied as the politics of the fifty states." 96 The particular differences in the
policymaking roles of the courts in this Article are due in part to differing
political and legal cultures, but one is also struck by how the differences in
judicial selection systems seem to affect the policymaking role of the respective
courts. Although Sheldon and Lovrich argue that highly articulated judicial
selection systems promote both judicial independence and accountability, 97 this
research suggests that the more visible and political the selection system,
meaning the more highly articulated is the selection system, the more active
role the courts play in the policymaking process.
Other research has found that differences in judicial selection systems do
not lead to differences in background characteristics of judges98 or to
differences in the esteem held for the judges by the public or by legal
professionals. 99 In fact, Jacob reflects much of the academic thinking on the
subject when he writes, "examination of selection procedures, however, does
96 TARR & PoRTER, supra note 2, at xvi.
97 Sheldon & Lovrich, State Judicial Recruitment, supra note 40.
98 See Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the
Gliaracteristics of Judges, 6 L. & Soc'Y REv. 579-94 (1972); Henry R. Glick & Craig F.
Emmert, Selection Systems and Jucidal Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme
Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228, 235 (1987); Elliot E. Slotnick, Review Essay on Judicial
Recruitment and Selection, 13 JusT. Sys. J. 109 (1988).
99 Erik Wasmann et al., Perceptions of State and Local Courts: A Comparison Across
Selection Systems, 11 JusT. Sys. 1. 168 (1986).
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not demonstrate that any particular formal selection procedure leads to better
judges." 1°° Yet varieties in the articulation level of the judicial selection
systems, such as the number of political actors involved in judicial selection,
affect whether and how a court's role as a policymaker is perceived by its
respective legislature. Thus, this research confirms Gates and Johnson's
conclusions that "although selection systems do not produce judges with widely
varying backgrounds, the systems themselves may influence the decision
making of judges and their relationship to the political system."' 10
The three governmental systems in this study certainly vary in the number
of actors who participate in the initiation, screening, and affirmation stages of
the judicial recruitment process. The highly articulated Ohio judicial selection
system, which allows for a large number of players at the various judicial
recruitment stages, helps produce the highly partisan and activist policymaking
role of the Ohio Supreme Court. The moderately articulated federal selection
system, with relatively few actors at the initiation and screening stages, helps
produce a court system that is perceived on Capitol Hill to be an active
participant in the federal policymaking process, although less active and less
confrontational than the Ohio courts. The very low articulation of the
Massachusetts judicial selection system, where very few actors participate in
any of the judicial recruitment stages, helps produce a very passive court.
In part, because federal judges are selected on the basis of their policy
preferences, the Congress perceives the federal courts as regular participants in
the policymaking process. Still, congressional reactions to federal court
decisions are generally considered to be unusual events. Because Ohio judges
must frequently run for re-election with the support of their political parties,
Ohio legislators perceive them to be highly activist partisans. Because
Massachusetts judges are often chosen for other than policy reasons, and
because they possess life appointments, Massachusetts legislators perceive them
to be almost invisible in the policymaking process. While the Ohio,
Massachusetts, and federal legislatures are very similar in many respects, they
have dramatically different perceptions of the policymaking roles of their
respective judicial colleagues. Thus, this Article has provided evidence that an
important institutional factor, the articulation level of the judicial selection
system, greatly affects interactions between courts and legislatures as well as
the policymaking role of the courts.
100 Jacob, supra note 2, at 269.
101 AMERICAN COURTS: A CIrMCAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 9, at 159.
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